united colours of vruz

Souciant

Daniel Levy is one of the most respected Israeli peace advocates in the United States. Best known for his role as a senior policy adviser to former Israeli Minister of Justice Yossi Beilin, Levy was a member of the Israeli delegation to the Taba Summit with the Palestinians in January 2001, and of the negotiating team for the “Oslo 2″ Agreement from May to September 1995, under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The former Director of Policy and International Efforts at Heskem, the Israeli headquarters of the joint non-governmental Israeli-Palestinian Geneva Initiative, Levy was the lead Israeli drafter of the legendary Geneva Accord. Today, he is a member of American Jewish peace organization J Street‘s Advisory Council, and a favorite target of right wing attacks.

With such a distinguished career, Levy’s candor, and his willingness to consider new approaches to Mideast peacemaking makes him a breath of fresh air. I met with him on April 21 in Washington, DC to discuss the bleak state of Israeli-Palestinian affairs and what hope one may find for the future.

Dear Mr. Obama,

by Gershom Gorenberg, The American Prospect

A clever person succeeds in climbing out of the hole that a wise one avoids falling into. So says a Hebrew adage often applied to national leaders. To my great sorrow, you have already missed the chance to respond wisely to the upcoming Palestinian bid for U.N. recognition. You still have a few days left to be clever. I desperately hope you use them.

You strode into a foreign-policy hole during your Middle East speech last May when you dismissed Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas’s plan to ask for U.N. membership an attempt “to isolate Israel at the United Nations.” If anyone missed your implied threat, a State Department spokesperson made it explicit last week, explaining that if “something comes to a vote in the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. will veto.”

This is a mistake several times over. Despite the habitually panicked tones from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian statehood is a gain for Israel. By promising a Security Council veto, you’ve tied your own hands in shaping a resolution that looks certain to pass in the General Assembly, and have harmed America’s ability to broker Israeli-Arab diplomacy.

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vruz: do right wingers still really think obama is a leftist?

via @Wikileaks

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001878 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA 
NSC FOR PASCUAL 
OSD FOR AGUIRRE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 
TAGS: PARM PREL KPAL PTER MOPS MARR IS EG
SUBJECT: STRATEGY FOR THE GAZA BORDER 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 1542 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. CAIRO 1516 
     ¶C. CAIRO 1436 
     ¶D. CAIRO 1029 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  Since the Egyptian-brokered "tahdiya" 
("calming") between Israel and Palestinian groups in Gaza 
took effect June 19, rocket attacks from Gaza have decreased, 
and Israeli public pressure on the GOE to stop smuggling via 
tunnels into Gaza has relaxed.  However, smuggling remains an 
important security issue.  We are working closely with Egypt 
to develop a comprehensive counter-smuggling strategy. 
Assisting the GOE with deployment of a U.S.-supplied 
counter-tunneling system on the Egypt-Gaza border provides 
Egypt with an opportunity to more fully exploit tunnels and 
break up smuggling rings.  As Egypt moves forward into a new 
phase of counter-smuggling efforts, we will continue our 
cooperation in a variety of areas:  helping interdict 
smuggling on Egypt's western, southern, and eastern borders; 
economic development in the Sinai; border security 
assistance; and de-mining.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted 
site surveys on the Gaza Border in June and at a training 
site in Giza, near Cairo, to support the GOE in deploying a 
U.S.-supplied seismic-acoustic counter-tunneling system (ref 
B), aiming to deploy this equipment on the Gaza border by 
early 2009.  The GOE's agreement to accept this equipment 
after initial resistance in 2007 is a sign of increased 
bilateral cooperation on border security, and the new 
technology, which can detect the sounds of tunnel digging and 
movement through tunnels, should improve GOE interdiction 
efforts.  The Egyptian-brokered tahdiya ("calming") that took 
effect June 19 has reduced tensions, and Israel's opening of 
some border crossings for supplies has slightly alleviated 
the humanitarian pressure on Gaza.  Yet, economic incentives 
for smuggling remain on both sides of the Gaza border, and 
Hamas' re-arming efforts will continue to drive the smuggling 
of weapons and explosives into Gaza, often through the same 
tunnels used for smuggling commercial items and contraband. 
 
¶3. (S) Destroying tunnels on the Gaza border is not as cut 
and dried as it might appear.  For example, the GOE believes 
that exploding the main tunnels under the border would result 
in unacceptable damage to housing in both Egyptian and 
Palestinian Rafah.  Moreover, Egypt realizes that Hamas 
retains the capacity to repeat its January 2008 border 
breach, despite Egyptian steps at deterrence, such as the 
GOE's recently completed three-meter high stone wall that now 
extends along the length of the 14 km border with Gaza. 
Shutting down tunnel smuggling could place added economic 
pressure on Gaza and increase the risk of another breach. 
 
 
¶4. (S/NF) We plan to engage the GOE on a number of short and 
long-term steps the Egyptians can take to prevent smuggling, 
including:  tunnel exploitation; interdicting smugglers on 
Egypt's western, southern and eastern borders; economic 
development in the Sinai; border security assistance; and 
de-mining.  The following is a list of steps we are taking to 
strengthen our dialogue with the GOE as it addresses 
smuggling into and out of Gaza. 
 
-- Tunnel Exploitation:  Current GOE counter-tunneling 
strategy focuses on closing tunnel openings.  A more 
effective GOE strategy would be to exploit the tunnels by 
using knowledge of the tunnel routes to catch smugglers 
red-handed and break up smuggling rings.  We are working with 
the GOE to understand the origins of smuggled munitions and 
explosives seized in the tunnels.  We will continue 
working-level discussions with the GOE on this issue, and the 
Ambassador will continue to raise tunnel exploitation with 
the Defense Minister and EGIS Chief Soliman.  (Note:  As 
noted in Cairo 1542, Soliman told the Ambassador that he knew 
that Egypt needed to close the main tunnels down.  End note.) 
 We will work with the GOE on using the new USACE 
counter-tunneling equipment effectively to map tunnel routes 
and catch smugglers when they arrive at the tunnel openings 
to deliver their goods. 
 
--Engagement on Smuggling Routes:  Although interdicting the 
Rafah tunnels is essential, it is still tantamount to playing 
 
CAIRO 00001878  002 OF 002 
 
 
"goal-line defense." Disrupting the smuggling routes in 
southern and eastern Sinai, from the Suez Canal crossings, 
the western desert, and the Sudanese border will be key to 
effectively decreasing smuggling into Gaza.  We will open a 
dialogue with the Interior Minister on MOI's role in stopping 
Sinai smuggling further away from Gaza. 
 
--Border Security Assistance:  We are initiating a 
comprehensive strategy to offer the GOE assistance on all 
elements of border security.  However, the GOE has been 
resistant thus far to admitting its need for assistance.  We 
have increased our engagement with the border guard forces 
and accompanied BGF officers on a recent trip to Sandia labs 
and a U.S. Border Patrol Headquarters in Texas.  We are 
urging the GOE to establish a relationship with the U.S. 
Border Cooperation Monitoring Center annex in Jordan.  We 
plan to begin a dialogue with the Ministry of Defense on how 
to shore up security on the Sudanese and Libyan borders by 
increasing BGFs and patrols, as well as possibly using FMF to 
upgrade BGF capabilities.  We also want to visit the southern 
and western borders to assess current GOE capabilities 
first-hand. 
 
--Economic Development in the Sinai:  Economic deprivation is 
a prime motivating factor in Bedouin smuggling between the 
Sinai and Gaza.  USAID is supporting the North Sinai 
Businessmen's Association micro-finance program, 
headquartered in Al-Arish, with a branch in Sheikh Zweida, 
approximately 10 km west of Rafah.  The Sheikh Zweida branch 
has micro-finance borrowers in Rafah.  USAID is also managing 
a $10 million project in central Sinai to develop 
infrastructure, community centers, schools, and eco-tourism. 
We will also continue our dialogue with the GOE to encourage 
creating an economic stimulus program for the Sinai. 
 
--De-mining/Munitions Collection:  Every year, Bedouin 
smugglers uncover buried munitions caches and mines in the 
Sinai dating to the Egyptian-Israeli wars.  The GOE currently 
focuses its de-mining efforts in areas identified for oil 
exploration and resort development.  We plan to open a 
dialogue with the MOD on expanding these efforts throughout 
the Sinai, possibly using FMF money. 
 
¶5. (C) Maintaining Humanitarian Flows into Gaza:  The 
shortage of goods in Gaza due to the Israeli embargo has 
stimulated a commercial smuggling network that arms smugglers 
have exploited.  The USG should encourage Israel to continue 
to allow humanitarian food and fuel shipments to enter Gaza, 
and to increase these shipments consistent with civilian 
needs in Gaza.  Increased humanitarian shipments will be 
especially important as increased smuggling interdiction puts 
added economic pressure on Gaza and raises the risk of 
another Hamas breach. 
SCOBEY